

Deliberative Oratory in the Darkest Hour: Style Analysis of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's Statement at the Security Council

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In 1971 Pakistan suffered a near death experience: genocide, civil war, migration and territorial reconfiguration. Central to understanding this experience is the statement of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (henceforth Bhutto) at the United Nations Security Council on December 15, 1971. This statement not only embodied the Pakistani reaction and explained the national viewpoint, but it brought forth the major complexities of and the participants in the conflict.¹ Pakistan's viewpoint termed the war as an Indian-Russian conspiracy and not a local movement and Bhutto's statement reflected this binary view. The participants were either aggressors: India and Russia or they were allies, China and U.S. Bhutto viewed France and Britain as aggressors as they had abstained from taking sides. As he tore his papers on the floor of the Security Council, Bhutto showed a deep contempt for the Indian-Russian alliance that had facilitated this disaster.

Writers have stated Pakistan was a country without a viable government, money, international policy or a constitution when the war reached the United Nations on December 4, 1971 (La Porte 105; Raza 122). Several draft resolutions were presented before the Security Council that were either suspended, rejected, vetoed or delayed for deliberation. Because of the unanimity among the members the question was referred to the General Assembly, where Pakistan scored its only diplomatic triumph with the "Uniting for Peace" resolution which recommended a ceasefire. This war was intricate in nature as it involved gross human rights violations and also a territorial conflict between two long-standing enemies. East Pakistan was not a colonial territory nor a separate nation. However the violations of murder, rape and arson were severe enough to deem it an international crisis. Sydney Schanberg, an eye witness and reporter termed it a pogrom and reported

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one million killed and 400,000 raped (qtd in Tharoor). Because of war crimes the issue came back to the Council. The movement between the two forums the General Assembly and the Security Council revealed a dismal understanding and weak handling of the war on Pakistan's side. Pakistani generals drew analogies between 1965 and 1971 and expected the war would end inconclusively as in 1965. They neglected diplomatic channels until the last week. Rafi Raza who accompanied Bhutto to the Security Council claims that they came too late. Bhutto arrived at the Council on December 10, when the Pakistan Army began suffering reversals and the Soviet Union began to appeal for a hearing for the Bangladeshi representatives (Raza 118). He expressed the Pakistani viewpoint in statements delivered on December 13 and 14. He appealed to the Council to condemn Indian aggression and order a ceasefire. US and China, Pakistan's allies, did little to help Pakistan diplomatically. Meanwhile back in the Security Council, the members proposed new resolutions that revealed Pakistan's deteriorating position. The three new draft resolutions, the Polish, the Russian and the Anglo-French recommended a ceasefire with troop withdrawal and power handed over to East Pakistanis. Pakistan's choices were grim: it could accept any resolutions or wait for the army to surrender. Finally on the December 15, Bhutto requested the president of Security Council to convene a session where, in the words of Khalid Hasan, he "made the most emotional, though well-prepared, speech of his career." The fall of Dhaka the next day put an end to all the deliberation.

The focus of this paper is a style analysis of the statement delivered by Bhutto at the United Nations Security Council on December 15, 1971. The statement has three versions: a brief version as reported in *The New York Times* and on YouTube videos. The second version called "My Country Beckons Me" appears in Sani Panhwar's website, www.bhutto.org which is a useful database on Bhutto. The last and more virulent version appears in the government publication, *Zulfikar Ali Bhutto Speeches in the Security Council September 22 1965, December 1971*. This statement has been derived from the last version, the government publication because it is the only published version which appeared during Bhutto's rule in 1972 and can be deemed as authentic.² Bhutto's personal

² Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *Speeches in the United Nations Security Council September, 22 1965 and December, 1971*. Karachi: 1975. Department of Films and Publication. 43-47

style, flamboyant and binary, is revealed in his writings. Rhetoricians, Edward P. J. Corbett and Robert J. Connors say that style is difficult to describe as it involves language, diction and structure (21). I understand a style analysis as the study of artful expression of ideas. It looks at structural features such as, sentence length, number of words and number of paragraphs.

It also looks at diction, figures of speech and the construction of statement or speech. Holistically a style analysis looks at audience, purpose and message and analyses how a speaker creates and maintains ethos. The style analysis will help to answer the research question: Why did Bhutto, a renowned diplomat, use such “undiplomatic” language in the statement? Why did he tear up his papers? Here is an excerpt from the statement that shows Bhutto’s undiplomatic language:

The Permanent Representative of the Soviet Union talked about realities. Mr. Permanent Representative of the Soviet Union, look at this reality. I know that you are the representative of a great country. You behave like one. The way you throw out your chest, the way you thump the table. You do not talk like Comrade Malik; you talk like Tsar Malik. (Bhutto 45)

I argue that Bhutto’s statement at the UN is a clash of two discourses: the scholarly and theatrical as he was trying to communicate with “two” distinct audiences simultaneously, the international community and the Pakistani nation. As a diplomat he appealed to the western audience and the international community to order a ceasefire so a small country with varied ethnic groups could defend itself. He used scholarly themes laced with rhetorical wordplay for this audience. This was a logical appeal that reached out to smaller countries with heterogeneous populations in the post-colonial era. As a political figure he tried to mentally prepare his voters for the reality of dismemberment and military defeat so they would absolve him of blame. He used theatrical, hyperbolic themes to connect to Pakistani audience. Withstanding his complex personality that points to “feudal ethos and megalomania” Bhutto may have wished to portray himself as an emotional leader as he understood the nuances of Pakistani culture (Gilani 217). Even in normal times, Pakistan’s patrimonial culture requires a feudal ethos and theatrical discourse. In such epic wartimes such discourse would be further exaggerated. Pakistan had been dramatically beaten (Ziring 582). At the eve of the fall of Dhaka, Pakistanis *would not* have responded to a reasonable, responsible, cautious statement. Bhutto created his statement and ethos keeping in

mind the emotional needs of his Pakistan audience. The following statement excerpt shows extreme theatrical discourse:

For four days we have been deliberating here. For four days the Security Council has procrastinated. Why? Because the object was for Dacca to fall. That was the object. It was quite clear to me from the beginning. All right, so what if Dacca falls?... So what if Dacca falls? So what if the whole of East Pakistan falls? So what if the whole of West Pakistan falls? So what if our state is obliterated? We will build a new Pakistan. We will build a better Pakistan. We will build a greater Pakistan... (Bhutto 40-44)

The excerpt begins in active voice, “For four days we have been deliberating here...” but then moves to the passive voice, “...the object was for Dacca to fall.” The sudden shift from the active to the passive hides the doer or the subject. The subject changes from “we” to the “Security Council” in the next sentence. The subject “Security Council” is carried forward in the next sentence, “the object was for..” which is in passive voice. The implied argument is that the Council let Dhaka fall and in this way destroyed Pakistan. The hyperbolic statements “so what if Dhaka falls”, “so what if East Pakistan falls” have a complex rhetorical effect because they are based on actual events and are simultaneously an exaggeration and a fact. Bhutto may have felt safe in indulging in hyperbole as territorially and diplomatically there was little to lose. Hyperbole elicits strong responses from readers, and these statements would have piqued Pakistani readers/ listeners. This hyperbole creates a rationalization that Pakistan was destroyed by the U.N. The next hyperbolic statement, “We will build a greater Pakistan” circumvents the main issues behind the war and creates a simplified solution to the problem. This brief style analysis is representative of the whole paper. The paper will analyze the Bhutto’s statement keeping in mind diplomatic discourse and deliberative oratory.

1. Diplomatic Discourse

Christer Jonsson and Martin Hall expand the understanding of diplomatic communications from “regulated process of communications” or “communication system of an international society” to include symbolic gestures (196). They argue that verbal communication, nonverbal symbols and public and private realms are important repertoire for diplomacy. Expanding on this definition, I posit that diplomatic discourse is the oral, written and visual communication by way of speech, gestures, documentation and body language between diplomats, members

of supranational organizations, global institutions and international groups. Minor gestures as handshakes, facial expressions, stance, tone of voice are thus an important part of diplomatic discourse along with tone, register and language. Diplomatic discourse is highly stylized, adaptive and strategic and depends on the speaker, culture, conflict and era. This conflict came during the Cold War era, where the U.N. worked as a court of appeal. Regional alliances as CENTO, SEATO very much reflected the global hegemony of the two superpowers. Regional powers, digital media and multinationals were yet to evolve and so diplomatic activity at the UN took an enhanced hue and shaped a country's image. Ray T. Donahue and Michael H. Prosser describe the United Nations as "the world's debating society" where countries and regions argue their viewpoints before an august, global audience (221). Condemnation by the UN of any country is diplomatically embarrassing and countries strive to avoid making statements that can bind them. Speechmaking is a social situation and countries display their diplomatic position by the rank of their officials (Donahue and Prosser 124). Pakistan sent its deputy prime minister, a higher-ranking official than India, who sent its foreign minister. This demonstrated the importance the country attached to the conflict. The aim of diplomatic discourse is to promote national values, and language is a tool in peace-building because it is used to create and sustain alliances. Francisco Gomes de Matos recommends that diplomats, "learn to identify and to avoid potentially aggressive, insensitive, offensive, destructive uses of languages" (283). Thus diplomats are trained to project a positive, restrained, serene and rational demeanor while undertaking negotiations on behalf of their country. Speeches at the United Nations can take two main forms: addresses and statements. Addresses are more formal and are given at regular sessions of the General Assembly and Security Council and reflect "a vision for the future"(Donahue and Prosser 223). Statements come at times of crisis during special or emergency sessions at the United Nations and reflect a country's point of view. The Security Council acts a court of appeal between nations by calling on members to stop aggression and withdraw forces. Since statements usually seek to "move an audience towards belief, policy or action" they are part of deliberative oratory (Donahue and Prosser 218).

Bhutto's speech was a statement. It borrowed from the genre of diplomatic discourse by firstly being strategic, secondly by pushing national aims and lastly by using scholarly themes. Scholarly themes are necessary in diplomatic discourse to sway members. These themes are also strategic as they aim for global harmony, national interest and help countries define policies towards an issue. Bhutto used strategy effectively when he reminded smaller countries with

heterogeneous populations that inaction by the United Nation could set a dangerous precedent for their own region. He argued that any country could suffer from secessionist elements and would resort to military force to put down rebels. The UN had to respect the territorial integrity of smaller countries. He argued that smaller countries had to survive in a bipolar world by aligning themselves with the two superpowers; this alignment upset the global balance of power. Bhutto's appeals to nationalistic aims sought to generate general diplomatic support, as he depicted India and Russia as warlike nations, denounced colonial powers for their inaction, and ironically praised China and America for their (nonexistent) support. Lastly the statement carried several scholarly themes with global ramifications: moral ideals, quotes from statesmen such as Jefferson and Wilson, global values such as eradication of poverty and global peace.

The statement broke several conventions of diplomatic discourse as it was simultaneously rude, belligerent and extremely personal. Bhutto's language was belligerent on occasion and his tone and body language were accusatory throughout. He used elaborate hand gestures when talking of "legalization of aggression" (Bhutto 39). Youtube videos from unspecified sources show him sitting back in his chair and turning around to look at everyone in the Council. He tapped his pen several times and did not refer to notes. He paused as he said, "We might have been a party to some settlement" and let his words sink in. His voice cracked with emotion and he waved his hands as he said, "...we will go back and fight." In the video footage, he ended the statement, tore up his papers and walked out the hall with the Pakistani delegation in tow. These symbolic gestures showed his utter disregard dissatisfaction with the proceedings. Even on paper Bhutto's rudeness is significant. He called the Russian representative "a Tsar" (Bhutto 45) and compared the Indian foreign minister to "a janitor":

Mr. President, you referred to the "distinguished" Foreign Minister of India. If he can be Foreign Minister of India, I could have been Prime Minister of united India. But I would rather be a janitor in a free country. (Bhutto 41)

Bhutto spoke in "a voice choking with emotion" (Tanner), and talked about himself excessively during the statement:

My people must know. I have not come here to accept abject surrender. If the Security Council wants me to be a party to the legalization of abject surrender, then I say that under no

circumstances shall *I* be. Yesterday *my* 11-year- old son telephoned *me* from Karachi and said to *me*, "Do not come back with a document of surrender. We do not want to see you back in Pakistan if you come like that." *I* will not take back a document of surrender from the Security Council. *I* will not be a party to the legalization of aggression. (Bhutto 39) (Emphasis added)

Excessive personal references are undesirable in diplomatic discourse as the country is more important than the diplomat. The speaker's aim is to find support for his country's cause while keeping himself in the background.

Deliberative Oratory

This statement was basically persuasive in nature and is an example of deliberative oratory. Corbett and Connors say deliberative oratory is concerned with comparing the worthy with the unworthy and seeks to persuade the audience to pursue a certain viewpoint (271). It is concerned with the expedient, which can be understood as an imperfection marked by a time constraint. The speaker not only wants to persuade his audience, he or she may also want to persuade them *within* a brief span of time. Since deliberative oratory is marked by time-constraints, it uses by- words for stress and to provoke a sense of urgency. These key words are repeated at different times of the discourse for emphasis and repetition. Because deliberative oratory is persuasive in nature, the speaker must have "strong insight into the topic and the audience" (Corbett and Connors 271). The audience has to be won over by depicting the outcome if a course of action is not pursued. Thus comparisons, metaphors and analogies with morals, famous individuals and historical events are common in deliberative oratory.

Bhutto's statement borrowed two conventions from deliberative oratory. First, he used extensive historical analogies. He compared the war to previous wars over disputed territories such as Cypress and Jerusalem. Bhutto also used all rhetorical means to compare Indian aggression to "Hitlerite aggression" (Bhutto 44) and "gunboat diplomacy" (Bhutto 44) implying the military might of the two countries was unbalanced and the world was allowing a larger country with military might to over run a weaker country. In this way he appealed to self-interested smaller countries that feared the territorial ambitions of their stronger neighbors. He painted a picture of a dysfunctional, bipolar world without

international law and precepts where smaller countries were forced to give up territory to larger countries and become “harlots of the world”:

You will be turning the medium-sized and the small countries into the harlots of the world. You cannot do that. It is against civilized concepts, it is against all the rules of civilization and of international morality and justice. (Bhutto 45).

Secondly he used repetition. Repetition of by-words is necessary for stress and to provoke a sense of urgency in deliberative discourse. Bhutto’s by-words referred to the ideals of international community: justice (16 times), free or free country (8 times), foreign occupation (5 times), world peace (4 times), truth (7 times). He repeated Pakistan (53 times) to emphasize his country’s predicament in dwindling time. Time is a precious commodity in wartime and affects the rhetorical situation. Time had run out for Pakistan as Indian troops were outside Dacca and the Pakistani generals had already asked for a surrender (Tanner). The Russian representatives were pressing for a hearing for the Bangladeshi representatives at the UN. Bhutto had merely hours to present his viewpoint, to extricate Pakistan’s honor and to survive this political disaster (Taseer 129). He invoked a sense of time by referring to the death toll in the war, a reference to loss of life that also formed an ethical appeal. Bhutto’s demeanor in the 1971 statement was therefore complicated. It was emotional and theatrical as it was a response to the complicated rhetorical conditions and it was scholarly as it was addressed to an august, law-making body. The statement sought to satisfy the demands of the genre of deliberative oratory even though it defied some of conventions of diplomatic discourse.

Bhutto and his Discourse

Bhutto (1928-1979) is known for his personal magnetism, Oxford diction and what Hafeez Malik says is an “acute sensitivity to the concept of balance of power” (205). It is difficult to categorize Bhutto’s discourse because he served in several roles: academician, diplomat, feudal, politician and ruler. Anwar Hussain Syed describes Bhutto as a mass leader and an intellectual and writes that Bhutto like other populist leaders, such as Nasser, Sukarno and Ghaddafi, ruled through a combination of charisma, autocracy, nationalistic rhetoric and alignment to world order (13). Bhutto used highly stylized language to become Pakistan’s second organic, charismatic, nationalist leader; and by 1971, the 43-year old was a

political maverick and well-known internationally for his flamboyance and oratorical flair.

Bhutto's evolving discourse at the United Nations

Bhutto's discourse in the United Nations began as a guarded, traditional deliberation, wary of global hierarchy, heedful of the limitations faced by smaller countries, and embellished with Latin phrases. His style was narrative and gradual, his arguments were based on *logos*. He mentioned international precepts and laws, theories of statecraft and related these to international predicaments. He repeated themes of peace and friendship. He was a typical diplomat: pedantic, restrained and formal. This quote illustrates formality and is a sample of his early speech where he addressed the General Assembly in 1957. Notice the use of Latin phrase and the pedantic style towards the end:

Before entering into the substance of the issue, please allow me, Mr. Chairman, Sir, to conclude, so to speak, my *obiter dictal* by saying that the most salutary aspect of this discussion is that the "End" or "Objective" of all gathered here is identical. That end is, if I may be permitted to take a slight liberty with the wording of the preamble, to save succeeding generations from the scourge of aggression. All are sedulously seeking to find lasting guarantees for the insurance of perpetual peace. (Bhutto speeches 1948-1965)

The pedanticism showed a careful and in-depth understanding of the global community which had common aims. However metadiscourse in the excerpt, "Before entering into the substance of the issue, please allow me, Mr. Chairman, Sir,..." is representative of seminal work. Because metadiscourse is wordy it shows indirection and formality in a statement before the speaker moves to the main topic. New speakers unsure of audience response use more formality and metadiscourse than experienced speakers. The use of Latin phrases shows his command over the language which was a probably a third language for him. This showcased his brilliance, his learning and his time at Oxford, the world's premier institution. He sounded like a textbook as he was learning the discourse and mannerism of an institution and may have felt this imitative style would show his "place" in the institution. Bhutto's age, 28 years, may have appeared as an impediment so he may have adopted this formal style so seasoned diplomats would consider him seriously. Later his discourse became natural but it was very

much the discourse of a diplomat from a small country. It was rare for a representative from a small country, like Pakistan to display effrontery against the cultural norms of the Security Council. Defying the social norms meant defying the power differential of the world order. A June 1964 speech to the UN similarly shows the formal, pedantic style while providing an intellectual argument on self-regulation:

We have studied the United Nations Charter and we know its limitations. The United Nations is not a super state nor a supreme court. It does not issue edicts or writs, which are necessarily complied with. The Charter has its limitations and we know the pitfalls in taking such problems to the United Nations. In the final analysis, these problems have to be faced and overcome by us, the people of Pakistan (Bhutto speeches 1948-1965)

The reference to documents and laws (charter, edicts, writs) again show a pedantic style. The formal style is enhanced by metadiscursive phrases, “necessarily complied with”, “in the final analysis” which draw attention to the writer. The initial use of the “we” pronoun is interesting as it is ambiguous and Bhutto could have meant himself, Pakistan or the developing world here. Ambiguity is desirable as it allows speakers to shift positions. Furthermore the explanatory statements, “It does not issue...” are ambiguous as they are exclusive in nature. They exclude the working of the UN and focus on its limitations, rather on what the UN does *not* do which in turn creates an argument for self-regulation that countries should resolve their own problems. Bhutto’s pedantic style changed significantly with the ‘65 war and his statements were often laced with hyperbole and irony. In ‘65 Pakistan took the Kashmir issue to the Council and saw a stalemate. Bhutto’s changing style showed pessimism with the UN. Kashmir the center of Bhutto’s hawkish agenda, piqued his belligerent stance. For instance, in a 1965 visit to the UN, he talked about avoiding war for economic well-being. However he chose to include confrontational language among his usual scholarly, humane arguments. After declaring he wanted peace, Bhutto called India “a great monster” and threatened “a thousand year war.” His infamous statement, “Indian dogs are going home...” in the Security Council also came during this session and was reportedly expunged from record (Taseer 60). These contradictory statements which simultaneously praise and declaim were clearly emotional nuance in communicating purpose:

We are a small country and as I said, our resources are limited—one has only to look at a map of the world and a map of the sub-continent to see that we are not interested in war. We do not want aggression—we do not want conflict. We want peace in order that our people can develop...We should like to see all our energies and all our efforts directed towards economic well-being... We are facing a great monster and a great aggressor. We shall wage a war for 1000 years, a war of defense... I am not referring here to some of the remarks made by countries which have no right to be here—they are not even countries... (Bhutto 1-5)

Emotional nuance is individualized marketing: phrases, gestures and body language that piques targeted individuals in a certain way. Floyd Henry Allport, the father of social psychology, describes emotional nuance “as an attitude to feel and react in a highly specific fashion towards another human being” (96). Using emotional nuance shows a deep understanding of the audience, message and purpose because it is tailored to each individual. The audience may feel that the speaker is addressing them individually. It is interesting to see *how and why* Bhutto used emotional nuance. His words reflected the ambivalent relationship between India and Pakistan from the Pakistani viewpoint. Hussain Haqqani writes that both countries needed peace before they could progress but, Bhutto like most Pakistanis particularly felt “that India had not truly recognized partition...” (97).

There are two significant examples of emotional nuance before the December 15 statement. The first was at Tashkent, where Bhutto showed his dissatisfaction with the Tashkent Pact by his sullen body language, sulking and later by paranoid, repetitive references (Junejo 51; Gilani 221; Raza 213). In disrespecting Ayub Khan, a Pakistani military dictator and his political godfather, Bhutto showed he was not only against the Pact and the hurried peace with India, but also against Khan and the establishment he represented. The message sent forth was that he “sanctioned” the Pact because of Khan’s presence. The second example was the statement delivered on 14 December, 1971. Amongst his scholarly arguments on alleviation of poverty and global peace, he used Punjabi phrases to address Swaran Singh, the Indian foreign minister, who spoke English in a strong Punjabi accent. In a show of undiplomatic behavior and emotional nuance, Bhutto mimicked him several times in private sessions at Pakistan’s

foreign ministry (Taseer 46). The clash of scholarly and the theatrical discourse is highlighted in 14 December statement. which uses Punjabi phrases in the end:

From the outset I am quite prepared to accept that we have made mistakes...We are prepared to rectify those mistakes in a civilized spirit... And if the world does not seize the problem, if the world does not have the courage and moral fiber to say that these issues must be resolved...And who will suffer? The poor people of India and Pakistan will suffer- and I am a friend of not only the poor people of Pakistan: I am a friend of the poor people of India also. We have more poverty than any other people in the world... Like Alice, we have come to Wonderland to tell you that our country and our subcontinent is turning into a wasteland... *Sonar Bangla, Sardar Sahib eta Ama der Sonar Bangla, Bharater nai*: listen, Sardar Swaran Singh, the golden Bengal belongs to Pakistan, not to India, Golden Bengal belongs to Pakistan. You cannot take away golden Bengal like that from Pakistan. We will fight to the bitter end ... (Bhutto 9-38) [emphasis added]

The Punjabi language is known for its coarse and earthy appeal and this usage brought a village brawl quality to the Security Council. Bhutto may have implied that he expected the listener, a person of a Punjabi heritage, to share the attributes of his language. He had talked about a thousand year war during the campaign and in the UN after '65. However taking it to the Security Council in the given circumstances seems foolhardy for a man of Bhutto's intellect. Why did he do it? Though scholars have tried to delve into Bhutto's complex psychology to assess his confrontational stance, we will look at rhetorical reasons. Bhutto realized that Pakistanis would be listening and tried to address them while talking to the Council. In essence, Bhutto spoke to "two" audiences simultaneously and varied his discourse accordingly.

Scholars have discussed Bhutto's understanding of audience, message and purpose in campaign discourse. All say he expertly played up to his audience's expectations. He knew how to cajole his audience and used emotional nuances to communicate with them at several levels. Syed writes that Bhutto's discourse was his legacy and that his conduct was a mirror in which Pakistanis could view themselves (253-259). Syed Zulfikar Gilani writes that his discourse cultivated his audience's need for identity and a redeemer or messiah (232). He

thrived on confrontation and assimilated the personal and political (228-229). Akmal Hussain writes that Bhutto cultivated his charisma and encouraged audience participation through rhetorical questions and rhythm. During delivery he sought to look and behave like his audience; he unbuttoned his collar, shirtsleeves and assumed the disheveled appearance of his audience (136). His critics call him a demagogue. Khalid Bin Sayeed says Bhutto entertained his audiences with mimicry and dramatics and was mostly an actor (51). Golam Waheed Chaudhary argues that he could only influence illiterate voters (236). Lawrence Ziring argues that Bhutto happened to be at the right place at the right time in a third world country where the political culture guaranteed the rise of single leader (582). However the extraordinary conditions in which Bhutto created this statement need to be assessed.

The 15 December Statement

This statement was made in extraordinary conditions because of Pakistan's position and Bhutto's own status. Pakistan was not only on the losing side but it was poised to lose half of its territory. There was virtually no historical precedent for this situation. Countries were disembodied after world wars: Ottoman Empire in 1921 and Germany in 1945. Pakistan would face dismemberment similar to that experienced by the Ottoman Empire and Germany and would be divided into smaller countries. Territorial dismemberment would accompany military surrender and national humiliation. The war was too short, the enemy too weak, and the Pakistani Army too entrenched in bloodletting to elicit international sympathy for surrender. Pakistan would suffer the disgrace of the biggest surrender in military history and 93,000 men would lay down their arms. The war meant the end of united Pakistan. There was also the problem of breaking such news to a deeply emotional public that had believed in the invincibility of its armed forces and in the superiority of its culture. Pakistani nationalism stressed cultural superiority over Bengalis and religious superiority over Hindus (Ahmed). Hussain Haqqani says Pakistani generals exaggerated the military strength of their soldiers and said that Muslims had the fighting prowess of five Hindus" (87). These conditions worsened the complicated rhetorical situation. There was also the problem of Bhutto's status. Unlike Swaran Singh, his Indian counterpart, Bhutto had the most to gain politically from the break up of the country as a leader. Unlike Singh, Bhutto was both diplomat and leader and both roles were in direct conflict. Pakistan's loss was his gain. Haqqani argues that Bhutto's trip

to the UN was arranged by the Army to put a civilian façade on a military debacle. The Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) realized that schism was inevitable and they would need a charismatic, civilian scapegoat to blame for the break up of Pakistan (88- 91). Bhutto was a deputy prime minister from a martial law regime that itself lacked legitimacy. Ironically he had no fiat and had been almost recalled on his way to New York (Raza 122). There was also the problem of weak ethos. Internationally Bhutto was viewed as brash and fiery (Raza 237; Pace). While at home despite his immense popularity, he was perceived as a maverick and was criticized for his boycott of the Assembly.

The direct audience for the statement was clearly hostile. This audience was comprised of members of the Security Council, elite press and the international community. The reports of mass killings, millions of refugees, and Indian rhetoric had transformed the conflict from an internal issue to a global conflict where superpowers picked sides in glaring view of the international press (La Porte 103). The indirect audience was the people of West Pakistan for whom the primary message was that East Pakistan was lost. Giving this audience the bad news was tricky as the state-controlled media and press had reported glorious victories until the day of the statement. For the East Pakistanis the message was that Bhutto accepted the mistakes made by the army and they could consider him a sympathetic leader. He tried to salvage national pride by shifting attention from the institutional to the individual.

Structure of the Statement

The statement itself was 4678 words long and divided into 26 paragraphs and 288 sentences. His greatest challenge in communicating with a disparate, vast audience. Bhutto used short sentences to simplify the message, and his balanced and varied diction used both formal language and colloquialism to reach his vast, multilingual and global audience. Yet his formal, highly stylized language is also laced with diplomatic jargon quite expected in the Council. Speakers from former colonies have to focus strongly on their diction or risk coming across as deficient, semi-literate or pedantic but Bhutto with his Oxford education faced no such challenge. And having been in the UN since 1957, he knew the demands of the register, genre and the importance of tone (Junejo 33). As he began, he reminded the Council that “a grave moment in his country’s history” gave him the right to speak:

We have met here today at a grave moment in the history of my country and I would request the Council kindly to bear with me and to hear the truth, the bitter truth. The time has come when, as far as Pakistan is concerned, we shall have to speak the truth whether members of the Council like it or not...We were hoping that the Security Council, mindful of its responsibilities for the maintenance of world peace and justice, would act according to principles and bring an end to a naked, brutal aggression against my people... I felt that it was imperative for me to come here and seek justice from the Security Council. But I must say, whether the members like it or not, that the Security Council has denied my country that justice. (Bhutto 39)

Bhutto began the statement in active voice, “We have met here at a grave moment..” which makes brisk, compelling prose and balances the use of abstract terms such as, “grave moment”, “bitter truth”, “brutal aggression”. Abstract terms show emotion and ideals but not doers of actions and are effective in creating *pathos*. The use of strong adjectives, “brutal”, “grave”, “bitter” have strong emotional overtones and immediately set a sanctimonious tone. It is up to Bhutto, the representative of a small country, to remind the UN of its responsibilities. He drew attention away from the responsibilities of Pakistani soldiers towards the responsibilities of the UN delegates. He discussed the principled stance of Pakistan as an independent country facing troubles created by a powerful neighbor. He referred to the history of the Indo-Pakistan conflict and prospects for peace. This was a good rhetorical choice as it was based on *logos*. Formal language is enhanced by nominalizations. Nominalizations give any speech a formal, slow style. Bhutto’s nominalizations included: “dilatory tactics” (Bhutto 39), “legalization of aggression” (Bhutto 40), “imprisonment” (Bhutto 48). He balanced the formal language with colloquialism, which allowed laymen, press and common people to understand a complicated geopolitical situation in which three countries, Pakistan, India and Bangladesh, claimed to be victims:

Let us face the stark truth. I have got no stakes left for the moment (Bhutto 40)

Well, you will be sunk (Bhutto 43)

We will not lick the dust. (Bhutto 46)

The rhetorical effect of colloquialism or everyday language is to simplify the message into something informal, casual which even the general public could understand. Colloquialism makes an abstract idea concrete.

Bhutto established the *ethos*, his authority, by referring to his career as a diplomat, his experience in the Council and also his own reputation as a noted orator. He quoted statesmen like Woodrow Wilson and Thomas Jefferson to identify with his audience. He used these references to frame himself not as a trouble-maker or demagogue but to show his audience, that though he was not from the western world he was an erudite, well-read man like them in thinking and education. They could trust him to tell the truth. In the opening that criticized the Security Council and India, Bhutto described Pakistan as a country wronged by its powerful neighbor, isolated by its allies and neglected by its former colonial masters, and so was forced to speak unpleasant truths and use harsh language because of the severity of the situation. Blistering criticism was tempered by few conciliatory words. He was most critical of the United Nations:

The Security Council has failed miserably, shamefully... President Woodrow Wilson said that he fought the First World War to end wars for all time. The League of Nations came into being and then the United Nations after it. What has the United Nations done? I know of the farce and the fraud of the United Nations. (Bhutto 40)

Bhutto used diction cleverly here by using related terms with emotional connotation: “Wilson”, “League of Nation” and “First World War”. These terms work together to impart a sense of impotence and feebleness because of their associative history. Then the use of emotional terms “shamefully”, “fraud”, “farce” further enhance this connotation. The idea generated is that UN is following in the footsteps of the League. Given the paucity of time, his tone was harsh and sanctimonious from the opening and, throughout the statement he would vary the level of emotional nuance and create theatrical discourse. As in deliberative oratory, he used by-words to exhort his listeners: justice (16 times), world peace (4 times), truth (7 times), Pakistan (53 times). He appealed to the higher aspirations of the Council as a global community. This conflict was an opportunity to exercise the principles of justice and truth which were the ideological foundations of the UN. Neglecting the issue would mean damaging its ideological foundations.

The statement also uses several imperative sentences, which convey a power differential by giving orders or commands. The word “must” is often used and implies that the speaker is somehow in the position to give such commands; this was an extraordinary choice given the rhetorical conditions.

I have some home truths to tell the Security Council. The world *must* know. My people *must* know. (Bhutto 40)

I go back to the Roman Empire and I say what Cato said to the Romans, "Carthage *must* be destroyed." (Bhutto 42)

He was a representative of a small country on the brink of extinction and his own position as deputy prime minister was shaky. Yet he gave advice and orders as if he were truly in power; this created his image of a global *wadera*. Even the plain declarative sentences sound defiant because of the use of action verbs such as must, will, do not:

Do not come back with a document of surrender. (Bhutto 40)

You *will be* turning the medium sized and small countries into the harlots of the world. You *cannot* do that. (Bhutto 45)

Declarative sentences make statements and give information about some noun or verb. Bhutto created an image of power despite with strong verbs such as “do not” and “cannot do”.

Most interesting is the use of abstract terms to refer to terms with negative connotation. These were negative terms such as the Pakistani Army, refugees and massacres which could not have not been mentioned in the Council without censure and would have weakened Pakistan’s stance . Abstract terms refer to ideals and are open to interpretation. He used the abstract terms to gloss over the actions of the Pakistani army who were responsible for the massacres and the refugee problem:

We have been subjected to attack by a militarily powerful neighbour. Who says that the *new reality* arose out of *free will*? (Bhutto 43)

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If the Security Council wants me to be *a party* to the *legalization of abject surrender*, then I say that under no circumstances shall I be. (Bhutto 40)

He used the passive voice to shift blame and to prevent mentioning the Pakistan army. The passive voice is always used in shifting blame and is an excellent way of breaking bad news as it hides the subject or the doer of action. It was useful to protect the Army from censure. Bhutto only mentioned the Pakistani soldiers once, in a quotation from British general who praised their valor. He mentioned the Pakistan army indirectly by referring to “the refugee problem” and called the “the massacres” “mistakes”:

The *refugee problem* was used as a pretext, an ugly, crude pretext, a shameful pretext to invade my country, to invade East Pakistan. (Bhutto 44)

Unfortunately, nothing was said of the *massacres* that took place between 1 March and 25 March. No doubt there were *mistakes* on our side. (Bhutto 44)

Bhutto understood that the involvement of several protagonists such as refugees, insurgents, two armies, the UN, Indians and the superpowers made the situation difficult to comprehend. He chose to explain the complicated situation by short sentences, which add energy to any speech (Corbett 465). Average sentence length in this discourse is 16 words³. Short sentences are easier to understand in speech and shows that Bhutto kept in mind the diverse, global listening audience while composing the statement. He also used short sentences to frame analogy and provide varied historical references as he perceived that other countries viewed the dismemberment as a war of liberation. Here are some examples of short sentences used in the statement:

Why can Texas not be free? Let there be a republic of Texas. (Bhutto 46)

Since the Opium War, China has seen reality. The reality for France was that it was under occupation. (Bhutto 42)

³ Corbett and Connor say average sentence length is calculated by dividing the total number of words by the number of sentences (361).

Ethiopia was under Fascist domination. But the Ethiopians fought... Ethiopia is free today. (Bhutto 42)

He also used short sentences to state his central argument. The central argument was laid out in syllogism, a logical appeal, and stated: All countries have problems and make mistakes but they are not dismembered. Pakistan has a problem and has made a mistake. Therefore Pakistan should not be dismembered.

Which Government does not make mistakes? But if some government has made a mistake, does it follow that the country itself must be dismembered, obliterated? Is that going to be the conclusion of the Security Council if it legalized Indian aggression on the soil of Pakistan? (Bhutto 44)

The syllogism simplified the complex event into a two-line argument that would have been easy for even a layman to understand. It also formed a logical appeal that would have piqued the self-interest of smaller countries with separatist groups. It also showed the listening audience that Pakistan was aware of its responsibility in the tragedy. For the Pakistani listeners the implied argument was that international powers contributed to the dismemberment.

The short sentences are placed in paragraphs of varying length. Paragraphs show progression of related ideas on a topic and are usually denoted in speech as pauses. Bhutto used 26 paragraphs in the official version which were both long and short since there were several related topics. The statement's structural strength is revealed in the paragraphing: he used each paragraph to discuss a different aspect. For instance Bhutto used paragraph 2 and 3 to describe the delays by the Council, paragraph 17 to defend the American stance. There are some transitional paragraphs such as 14 and 16 that discuss ideas of world stability and primarily addressed to the Council. There are some capsule or short paragraphs 12, 21 that show that Bhutto was trying to cover a lot of ground in a short time:

East Pakistan is an integral part of Pakistan. Kashmir is a disputed territory. Why does India then not permit it to exercise its will? (Bhutto 44)(Par.12)

Muslim Bengal was a part of Pakistan of its free will, not through money. We did not buy it as Alaska was purchased. Why do the people of the United States not see that? (Bhutto 44)(Par. 21)

Pronominal references have been used creatively in the statement. The use of second person pronoun “you” made it seem that Bhutto was addressing the listener directly. This gave the entire statement the impact of face-to-face conversation—inclusive and personable—despite being delivered to a larger audience:

You do not need a Secretary General. *You* need a chief executioner. (Bhutto 40)

But the Indians are so short-sighted... But *you* know they do not have vision. (Bhutto 41)

So *you* will see now: this is not the end of the road; this is the beginning of the road... (Bhutto 44)

An interesting finding is the glaring overuse of first- person, singular pronoun. Bhutto referred to himself about 88 times in the statement: he “spoke from the heart”, spoke about his son, his reputation as speaker and his victory in the polls, which was “greater than Mujib ur Rehman’s.” It is difficult to separate the political from the personal in some paragraphs:

I told the United States Ambassador in Pakistan that once a civilian government came into being in Pakistan, *I* was prepared to go to the refugee camps *myself* to talk to them. But they pre-empted it all because the refugee problem was used as a pretext to dismember *my* country. (Bhutto 44) (Emphasis added)

Finally, *I* am not a rat. *I* have never ratted in my life. *I* have faced assassination attempts, *I* have faced imprisonments. *I* have always confronted crises. Today I am not ratting, but *I* am leaving your Security Council. *I* find it disgraceful to *my* person and to *my* country to remain here a moment longer than is necessary. *I* am not boycotting... (Bhutto 47-48) (Emphasis added)

Seeing Bhutto’s tremendous eruditeness these statements were a deliberate choice and really tested the limits of diplomatic discourse and truth. Why did he do it? Though it makes for egocentric prose it achieved an important rhetorical goal; the focus of the statement shifted from Pakistan to Bhutto. The man was more visible than his country. This may have seemed to him a good way of

deflecting attention from the terrible humiliation that lay ahead for Pakistan and politically it was advantageous because it showed him as a strong leader who understood his nation.

3. Stylistic Features and Their Rhetorical Effects

Though there are several stylistic features used in the statement I will focus on those that are intimately connected to audience, purpose and message. Bhutto used emotional nuance through rhetorical question and irony, fulfilled purpose through metaphors and metonymy, and stressed the message through anaphora and epistrophe.

There is a discernable pattern of rhetorical questions followed by historical reference. The rhetorical question is used to invoke audience participation and make them feel that the speaker shares their values. It was Bhutto's signature style in campaign speeches, where he used it to assume a defiant posture. Here he used it to create doubts in the listener's mind regarding India:

How is he [the Indian Foreign Minister] distinguished when his hands are full of blood, when his heart is full of venom? (Bhutto 41)

What hope will India give to the people of East Pakistan? What picture of hope is it going to give when its own people in Western Bengal sleep in the streets, where there is terrible poverty, where there is terrible injustice and exploitation, when the parliamentary rule in West Bengal has been superseded by presidential rule? (Bhutto 46)

Rhetorical questions induce the listeners to make an appropriate response and are good devices to keep the audience rhetorically engaged. Here Bhutto used contrasting elements: hope and injustice, presidential rule and parliamentary rule to augment his broader argument of justice and injustice.

Bhutto used apposition exquisitely as irony (emotional nuance) in the statement. Apposition places two coordinate elements side-by-side: the second coordinate explains the first. He used apposition to confront the Indian and Russian representatives and represent them as figures of ridicule:

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If he can be Foreign Minister of India, I could have been Prime Minister of united India. But I would rather be a janitor in a free country. (Bhutto 41)

I know you are the representative of a great country, you behave like one. The way you throw out your chest, the way you thump the table. You don't talk like Comrade Malik, you talk like Tsar Malik. (Bhutto 45)

I don't see what objection he has to it if he sees some similarity between his [Russian] empire and the Roman Empire. (Bhutto 42)

These ironical references are rude, sarcastic and an extreme example of emotional nuance that flout all rules of diplomatic discourse. Irony shows Bhutto's true understanding of elite press (audience) who are more likely to remember and report hyperbolic phrases rather than any clichés. The ironical references also depict contrasting elements or analogies through rhetorical wordplay: "Foreign Minister", "Prime Minister"; "Czar Malik", "Comrade Malik". It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze why Bhutto said this, but one reason may be that Bhutto decided to live up to his reputation as a fiery speaker by indulging in hyperbole and emotional nuance. In some ways he spoke to these individuals as he spoke to political opponents.

He fulfilled purpose through metaphors and metonymy. Metaphors are analogies or comparisons between two similar objects and ideas and express value judgment. Metaphors fulfill the audience's need for simplification (Corbett and Connors 479). Bhutto's metaphors include:

My heart is bleeding. (Bhutto 45)

You will be turning the medium-sized and the small countries into the harlots of the world. (Bhutto 45)

We are your guinea pigs. (Bhutto 46)

Finally I am not a rat. (Bhutto 47)

They seem like survival metaphors as both guinea pigs and rats are hunted down or used in experimentation. Comparing small countries to harlots drew attention

to the precarious situation of weaker countries in a bipolar world. Survival metaphors served to remind smaller countries of the current static hierarchy and power differential. They also helped to repeat the message in a subliminal manner. Bhutto used metonymy for brevity. Metonymy substitutes some attribute or suggestive word for what is actually meant and it is useful for rhetorical wordplay. He summed up the past, present and the future of Indo-Pak relations in a word: Carthage (Bhutto 42), an allusion with a powerful, succinct affect that may have affected the audience because of his well-known hawkish agenda. The connotations of Carthage are infinite, continuous wars until the complete destruction of the enemy.

Bhutto stressed the message through epistrophe and anaphora. These stylistic devices are useful for repetition. Epistrophe is the repetition of the same word or phrases at the end of each successive clause or sentence. Bhutto's epistrophes include:

China was *under foreign occupation* for years. Other countries have been *under foreign occupation*. France was *under foreign occupation*. Western Europe was *under foreign occupation*. (Bhutto 41) (Emphasis added)

But you know *they do not have vision*. The partition of India in 1947 took place because *they did not have vision*. Now also they are lacking vision. They talk about their ancient civilization and the mystique of India and all that. But *they do not have vision* at all. (Bhutto 41) (Emphasis added)

Epistrophe is effective and resonant as a memory aid because it repeats terms and allows listeners to remember some of the speech. Had Bhutto said, "France, China and Western Europe were under foreign occupation" it would have been effective but dull. Epistrophe enlivens prose and makes it memorable.

Anaphora is the repetition of the same word or phrases at the beginning of each successive clause or sentence. Here are some examples of anaphora from the statement:

Let us build a monument to the veto, a big monument to the veto. *Let us build* a monument to the impotence and incapacity of the Security Council and the General Assembly. (Bhutto 41)

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You have to be either on the side of justice or on the side of injustice; *you are either* on the side of the aggressor or of the victim. There is no third road. It is a black and white situation in these matters; there is no grey involved. *You are either* for right or you are for wrong; *you are either* for justice or for injustice... (Bhutto 47)

Anaphora gives a ringing tone to any paragraph and in the first example it accompanies a hortative sentence type, “Let us...” which gives it a sanctimonious, bitter aspect. Again Bhutto is reminding the Council of its duties. These devices are used for emphasis and rhythm as they are repetitive and resonate longer in memory. These also show the arrangement of words in increasing importance and add a sense of climax. Bhutto used the terms “right/ wrong” and then followed it with stronger terms “justice/injustice”, which are much more appealing terms for a global community. Rhythm piques listeners’ expectations and is used to embellish oral and written texts. This attention to sentence arrangement brings desired ideas into focus and also shows the arrangement of words in increasing importance. However both stylistic devices working together in one sentence may not have the desired effect.

So what if the whole of East *Pakistan falls*? *So what if* the whole of West *Pakistan falls*? *So what if* our state is obliterated? *We will build a new Pakistan. We will build a better Pakistan. We will build a greater Pakistan.* (Bhutto 41)

As the paragraph progresses the listeners’ attention is focused on the subject of the sentence “We will,” which is repeated through anaphora and depicts resolve and determination. However with the use of epistrophe the listener’s attention shifts from the subject phrase “We will” to the predicate phrase “build a new Pakistan.” The change in focus from the doer, “We” to the object “a new Pakistan” is somewhat jarring. This is an example of overuse of stylistic technique. The paragraph becomes somewhat too rhetorical and the effect is bombastic and hollow. The use of hyperbole is overdone and complex in this instance.

In conclusion, the statement is a vivid, electrifying discourse that appeals to *pathos* and varies between a caveat and narrative. Barring a few stylistic flaws, the use of concrete terms and active voice make the statement inspiring. There is

flowing prose and strong rhythm throughout the statement. There is a coherent argument sustained through syllogism, contrasting elements and historical analogies.

5. Conclusion

Near death experiences of nations are difficult to communicate. The choice of the announcement of the surrender was crucial as Pakistanis were expecting victory. As an elected leader Bhutto chose to let the army announce the surrender. He established his legitimacy as the leader by distancing himself from the military junta by evoking key phrases and promoted himself more than his cause. His theatrical discourse may have been seen as an affront to the Council by the international community who disregarded his emotional appeals. Ironically the fall of Dhaka the next day ended the deliberation.

Bhutto's rhetorical aims with the direct audience had a shock value: though the Security Council went back to procedural matters, the elite press played up to his expectations by vivid reporting of the statement. His theatrics gained as much attention as the Fall of Dhaka. *The New York Times* reported that as Bhutto walked out, members of the Council looked on expressionlessly and after a moment of silence the President Ismael. B Taylor gave the floor to a Tunisian delegate and the Council droned on. *The Washington Times* called it "living theatre". The British press was quite critical of Pakistan.:The *Sunday Telegraph* said Britain should have supported India instead of remaining neutral, which was ironically one of Bhutto's minor points. The *Daily Mirror* blamed Pakistan for the war, saying it had forced West Asia to the point of war (Nagendra Kr Singh, Vol 2).

Pakistan's daily *Dawn* ignored the fall of Dhaka the next day and chose to focus on Bhutto. It reported matter-of-factly on December 16, "UN a farce, says Bhutto- walks out" (Bangladesh Genocide Archives).

Bhutto was more successful with his indirect audience, the Pakistanis. Though theatrical, deeply personal and hyperbolic, the statement served their emotional needs. He told them what they wanted to hear, which was that Pakistan would survive. They wanted to *blame someone*; India, Russia or an international conspiracy for the near death experience. His statement told the world that Pakistan possessed organic, popular, and forceful leadership that was as

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anomalous as the nation. The Pakistani press played up the theatrical, florid side of the statement and Bhutto came to power in a burst of popularity.

In some ways Bhutto may have been *too* successful in his rhetorical aims with the Pakistani audience, since he may have deflected attention away from the true events behind Fall of Dhaka that later it became difficult for Pakistanis to believe in the genocide unleashed by the Pakistani army. The genocide was remembered euphemistically as military action, the suffering of war refugees was eclipsed by the capture of prisoners of war. Later scholarship such as Ziring and Choudhury minutely analyzed Bhutto's role and rhetoric in the breaking up of Pakistan and disregarded the role of Pakistan Army in affecting Bhutto's discourse. This needs further study.

Bhutto projected himself as a human microcosm of the country. At that moment in the Security Council he *was* Pakistan with all its rage, prejudices and complexities. No Pakistani leader would have dared used such rhetoric against the superpowers on their own turf. It is also doubtful that any other discourse would have satisfied the Pakistani people in their darkest hour.

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